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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision on December 24, 2009. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(a), and in accordance with Utah 
Code Ann. §78A-3-102(5) and Rules 45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision rendered by the 
Court of Appeals. The Utah Court of Appeals opinion is reported at Lopez v. 
United Auto. Ins. Co.. 222 P.3d 1192 (Utah App. 2009). A copy of the opinion 
is attached in the addendum and marked as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, The 
Utah Supreme Court granted United Automobile Insurance Company (UAIC) and 
El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (El Sol.) Petition for Writ of Certiorari as to the 
following issues: 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and/or application of 
the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by Utah Code. Ann. § 
31A-22-305.3(2)(g). 
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in failing to remand for ascertainment of 
the amount of damages. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On certiorari, this court reviews the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial court's 
decision under the appropriate standard of review. Pratt v. Nelson. 164 P.3d 
366, Tf 12 (Utah 2007). When performing this review, this court reviews the 
lower court's legal decisions for correctness, without deference. See Rawson v. 
Conover. 20 P.3d 1J 25 (Utah 2001). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
The following subsections of Utah Code § 31A-22-302 (2006) are controlling in 
this appeal: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy 
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall 
include: 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305.3, unless 
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305.3(2) 
Additionally, Utah Code § 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (i) and (ii) (2006) are 
controlling in this appeal. These subsections provide: 
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(g)(i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 
31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellee Maria Lopez (Lopez) individually and on behalf of a 
purported class sued Defendants/Appellees UAIC and El Sol for breach of contract 
and negligence. (R. 1). After stipulations were filed, UAIC and El Sol filed a 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 39-51). In response, Lopez filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment with affidavits of Maria Lopez and non-party, Miriam 
Salazar, the named insured under the applicable policy issued by UAIC, along with 
a Rule 56(f) affidavit of her counsel. (R. 52-82). In her motion for summary 
judgment Lopez did not request that damages be awarded to her. Instead, Lopez 
requested the Court to rule that she had $25,000 in underinsured motorist coverage 
available to her. Id. UAIC and El Sol filed a reply memorandum in support of 
their motion for summary judgment, a memorandum opposing Lopez's motion for 
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summary judgment, a motion to strike the affidavits of Lopez and Salazar and a 
motion to strike the Rule 56(f) affidavit. (R. 83-107 and 116-127). 
On September 4, 2008, following briefing and oral argument, the trial court 
issued a memorandum decision and order granting UAIC and El Sol's motions to 
strike the affidavits of Lopez and Salazar. The court also struck the Rule 56(f) 
affidavit and granted UAIC and El Sol's motion for summary judgment on all 3 
counts of Maria Lopez's complaint. The court also denied Maria Lopez's motion 
for partial summary judgment. (R. 147). 
Maria Lopez timely filed an appeal of the trial court's decision. The Court of 
Appeals on December 24, 2009 issued a decision affirming in part, reversing in 
part and remanding the case to the trial court. (Ex. A). 
UAIC and El Sol subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 
Utah Supreme Court that was granted May 13, 2010. In this appeal, UAIC and El 
Sol are asking this Court to rule that the Court of Appeals incorrectly reversed the 
trial court's entering of summary judgment in their favor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Non-party Miriam Salazar purchased a UAIC policy through the independent 
insurance agent El Sol on February 1, 2007. (R. 36). On February 8, 2007 Salazar 
was driving the automobile covered by the policy with Lopez as her passenger and 
they were involved in an accident. In her complaint, Lopez alleges that she is 
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entitled to underinsured motorist coverage. (R. 1-12). However, the named 
insured, Salazar, signed a form complying with Utah law rejecting underinsured 
motorist coverage. (R. 36-38, UAIC 00030, Exhibit B). 
Utah law permits a named insured to completely reject underinsured motorist 
coverage. Utah Code Ann §31A-22-305.3(2) provides: 
(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an 
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under 
Subsection 31 A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable. 
The requirements for a rejection of underinsured motorist coverage are that the 
rejection be in writing and on a form provided by the insurer that includes a 
reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage. That statute does not 
define "a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage" but the 
Insurance Code does define "underinsured motorist coverage". 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i) reads: 
Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-
302(1 )(c) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of 
underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, 
disease, or death. 
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The term "underinsured motorist coverage" is not defined anywhere else in the 
Insurance Code. UAIC utilized the definition found at 31 A-22-302(l) to supply its 
own explanation of "underinsured motorist coverage", which UAIC advances 
reasonably explained the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage and when it 
would be applicable. Thus, there is no dispute that Salazar signed a written form 
provided by UAIC. It is also clear that the form contained a reasonable 
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would 
be applicable. 
As an out-of-state insurer UAIC looked to the Utah Insurance Code for a 
reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage. UAIC's form read: 
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every 
automobile policy include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily 
Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless 
you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury Coverage or reject 
the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage 
entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage 
provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner 
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease or death. 
(See Exhibit B). 
The definition provided by UAIC on its form is nearly identical to the 
definition of the term provided by the Utah Insurance Code. 
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On this form, Miriam Salazar selected uninsured motorist coverage equal to her 
bodily injury liability limits and rejected underinsured motorist coverage entirely. 
Id- Miriam Salazar signed the form confirming that she understood and agreed to 
the selection of these limits. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly held that the rejection form signed by Miriam Salazar 
clearly incorporated statutory language to reasonably explain the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage and when underinsured motorist coverage would 
be applicable as required by Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g). Accordingly, 
the trial court correctly granted UAIC and El Sol summary judgment because no 
genuine issues of material fact existed that UAIC and El Sol met the statutory 
requirements of Utah Law for an insured to affirmatively waive underinsured 
motorist coverage. 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the trial court's decision. 
The Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or application of the meaning of 
the "reasonable explanation" required by the statute. The Court of Appeals, 
without citation or reasoning, summarily concluded that the explanation of 
underinsured motorist coverage contained on the UAIC form was not a reasonable 
explanation. The Court of Appeals made this conclusion even though the 
explanation contained on the form was nearly identical to the definition of 
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underinsured motorist coverage contained in the Insurance Code and was on a 
form filed for use with the Utah Department of Insurance. This conclusion was in 
error and violated proper statutory construction. 
The explanation of underinsured motorist coverage contained on the UAIC 
form was a reasonable explanation because (1) it utilized a nearly identical 
definition of underinsured motorist coverage contained in the statute, (2) was in 
plain English, (3) was unambiguous and (4) was on a form that was accepted for 
use in this State by the Department of Insurance. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals erred when it remanded the case to the trial 
court to enter judgment in favor of Lopez in the amount of $25,000. Lopez only 
filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Lopez' motion for summary 
judgment only sought an order that the waiver was insufficient as a matter of law 
by failing to comply with the applicable statute. (R. 114). She did not seek 
damages. In her memorandum of points and authorities in support of her motion 
for partial summary judgment Lopez merely requested that she be given coverage 
in the amount of her bodily injury liability limit of $25,000; not that she be 
awarded $25,000. (R. 106). 
UAIC and El Sol request that the decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed 
and that the trial court's granting of summary judgment be affirmed. If this Court 
affirms the Court of Appeals' decision by deciding partial summary judgment for 
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Lopez was correct, UAIC and El Sol then ask that the case be remanded to the trial 
court to decide the issue of damages, if any. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION 
AND/OR APPLICATION OF THE MEANING OF THE 
"REASONABLE EXPLANATION" REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g). 
Section 31A-22-305.3(2)(g) governs the complete rejection of underinsured 
motorist coverage. This section provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(g)(i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage 
by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability 
coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a). 
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the 
insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose 
of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be 
applicable. 
Therefore, to constitute a valid rejection of underinsured motorist coverage, 
Miriam Salazar's rejection had to be in writing, on a form provided by UAIC and 
contain a "reasonable explanation" of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable. There is no issue that the rejection was 
written and on a form provided by UAIC. At issue is whether UAIC provided Ms. 
Salazar with a "reasonable explanation" of underinsured motorist coverage. 
The rejection form read in relevant part: 
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AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every 
automobile policy include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily 
Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless 
you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury Coverage or reject 
the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage 
entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage 
provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner 
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of 
bodily injury, sickness, disease or death. 
(R. 36-38, UAIC 00030, Exhibit B). 
It is UAIC's position that the waiver form complies with Utah law. First, 
UAIC's definition of underinsured motorist coverage closely mirrors the statutory 
definition of the term. Second, the language of the form is plain and clear. No 
complex or complicated language is used. If the Court of Appeals had correctly 
construed and/or applied the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g) it would have found that the form contained 
a reasonable explanation, and affirmed the trial court's decision granting summary 
judgment to UAIC and El Sol. 
A. BY UTILIZING THE VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL 
DEFINITION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST AS THE 
ONE CONTAINED IN THE INSURANCE CODE, THE 
REJECTION FORM PROVIDED A REASONABLE 
EXPLANATION OF UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
COVERAGE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
10 
The form utilized by UAIC contained nearly the identical definition of 
underinsured motorist coverage as the one contained in the Utah Insurance Code. 
This virtually identical definition constitutes a "reasonable explanation" as 
required by the Utah Code Add. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g). The Court of Appeals erred 
in its construction and/or application of the meaning of "reasonable explanation" 
when it held that the form at issue did not meet the requirements in that statute. 
This rejection form contains a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable because it tracks the statutory language 
in the Utah Code and is simple, direct and easy to understand. The Utah Code 
defines "underinsured motorist coverage" as follows: 
Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-302(l)(c) 
provides coverage for covered persons who are entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles 
because of bodily injury sickness or death. 
See Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i). The language explaining 
underinsured motorist coverage on the rejection form is virtually identical to the 
definition contained in the applicable statute. Accordingly, the written form signed 
by Miriam Salazar rejecting underinsured motorist coverage contains a reasonable 
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would 
be applicable. It seems impossible to argue that an explanation is not reasonable 
when it is virtually identical to the explanation provided by the Insurance Code. 
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Moreover, the definition is simple, direct and contains no words or language that 
an ordinary lay person would not understand. 
The Court of Appeals believed that UAIC did not provide a reasonable 
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage because the definition tracked by 
UAIC referenced another section of the code. According to that court, this meant 
that the legislature intended the definition of underinsured motorist coverage given 
in the statute be read in the "context of the entire statutory scheme." (Exhibit A, p. 
6). That analysis is flawed. First, the reference within the definition of 
underinsured motorist coverage was merely referring to 31A-22-302(l)(c) which 
requires every policy of insurance purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's 
security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, unless affirmatively waived. The 
Insurance Code's reference to that subsection does not offer a more detailed 
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage, and its omission by UAIC does not 
make its explanation of underinsured motorist coverage less reasonable. Second, it 
is illogical to require a carrier to include a copy of the entire insurance code. The 
definition in the Insurance Code stands alone and plainly sets forth the purpose of 
underinsured motorist coverage. UAIC deliberately relied upon the Utah Insurance 
Code to provide its reasonable explanation of Underinsured Motorist Coverage. 
UAIC's incorporation of nearly identical language from the Insurance Code 
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provides a "reasonable explanation" of the purpose of underinsured motorist 
coverage and when it would be applicable. 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE UTILIZED IN THE REJECTION 
FORM CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF 
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE AS REQUIRED 
BY THE STATUTE. 
The term "reasonable explanation" is not defined by case law, statute or 
regulation. Although it is not defined in the statute, it is not ambiguous, for the 
legislative meaning can be gleaned from the definition of the individual words 
comprising the phrase. See State Ex. Rel. A.C.. 97 P.3d 706, If 13 (Utah App. 
2004). Additionally, this Court has a long history of relying on dictionary 
definitions to determine plain meaning. See State v. Redd. 992 P.2d 986, f^ 11 
(Utah 1999). 
"Reasonable" is commonly defined to mean "not extreme or excessive" or 
"fair". State Ex. Rel. A.C. at U 14. "Reasonable" is defined as "sensible, not 
excessive". See Webster's New World Dictionary. 2nd Edition (2002). In the area 
of law, "reasonable" is defined as "fair, moderate, and suitable under the 
circumstances." See Black's Law Dictionary. Sixth Edition (1991). "Explanation" 
means "the act or process of explaining". See Merriam-Webster Online 
Dictionary. "Explain" means "to give the meaning of. See Webster's New World 
Dictionary. 2nd Edition (2002). 
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Accordingly a "reasonable explanation" of underinsured motorist coverage is a 
sensible, fair, not excessive process of explaining or giving the meaning of 
underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, a "reasonable explanation" is not a 
rigorous standard to meet. The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to 
provide payment of certain benefits for damages caused by underinsured persons. 
Underinsured motorist coverage is applicable when damages are caused by owners 
or operators of underinsured motorist vehicle. The purpose of underinsured 
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable are simple and plainly 
explained in the definition utilized by UAIC. 
Despite the seemingly easy burden of providing a "reasonable explanation" the 
Court of Appeals, without any case law citation, other than non-applicable dicta 
contained in General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz. V. Tipton, 158 P.3d 1121, (Utah 
App. 2007), cert. Denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007)), concluded that the 
explanation of underinsured motorist coverage provided by UAIC was not a 
reasonable explanation. UAIC did provide a "reasonable explanation" with its use 
of unambiguous language that mirrored the language of the Insurance Code, 
especially because a "reasonable explanation" does not denote a rigorous standard. 
The explanation supplied by UAIC on its rejection form used ordinary words 
and provides that Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment 
of benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of an underinsured motor 
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coverage. It is difficult to determine how this does not meet the requirement of a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when 
it would be applicable. 
In finding that the form did not comply with the statutory requirements, the 
Court of Appeals violated the rules of statutory interpretation by inferring and 
adding additional terms or requirements that are not present in the Insurance Code. 
Courts must not read into statutes terms the legislature could have included but 
did not. When interpreting statutes courts look first to the statute's plain language 
with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent. See Savage 
v. Utah Youth Vill.. 104 P. 3d 1242, | 18 (Utah 2004). Courts presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary 
and accepted meaning. See State v. Barrett. 127 P.3d 682, Tf 29 (Utah 2005). In 
performing statutory interpretation courts refrain from reading additional terms 
into the statute. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 164 P.3d 384, ^ J 53 (Utah 
2007). 
The statute only requires a "reasonable explanation." In its decision, the Court 
of Appeals, without any direct citation, requires the form to include information 
that goes beyond a reasonable explanation. The Court of Appeals in finding that 
the explanation was not reasonable conclusively notes that to be reasonable the 
insurer must demonstrate that a meaningful offer of coverage was made and that 
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that goes beyond a reasonable explanation. The Court of Appeals in finding that 
the explanation was not reasonable conclusively notes that to be reasonable the 
insurer must demonstrate that a meaningful offer of coverage was made and that 
offer was sufficient to permit the insured to make an intelligent, informed decision 
on desired or desirable coverages. Lopez at U 15. Additionally, the Court of 
Appeals concludes that the form does not give that reasonable explanation using 
language that would be understood by an ordinary consumer. Id. at f 20. 
Although, the Court of Appeals concedes that a lengthy treatise on underinsured 
motorist coverage was not required, it provides no further explanation as to the 
requirement for a reasonable explanation, or why UAIC's explanation was not 
reasonable. 
Since the rejection form is virtually identical to the statutory definition of 
underinsured motorist coverage, for a court to hold that the rejection form does not 
contain a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage, it would also 
have to declare that the statute defining underinsured motorist coverage is vague 
and ambiguous. No court has found that statute vague or ambiguous. 
The Court of Appeals' claim that UAIC failed to provide a reasonable 
explanation because it combined its discussion of underinsured motorist and 
uninsured motorist coverages is equally unpersuasive. Until recently, those 
explanations were combined in the Insurance Code and with separate places to 
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party Salazar clearly understood the explanation that there were two different 
coverages, because she selected uninsured motorist coverage and rejected 
underinsured motorist coverage. See Ex. B. 
In addition to utilizing the statutory definition of underinsured motorist 
coverage, and writing the explanation in unambiguous language, the form utilized 
by UAIC was filed for use with the Utah Department of Insurance pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §31A~21-201. See Exhibit C. Pursuant to that Insurance Code 
subsection, the Insurance Commissioner may prohibit the use of a form at any time 
upon a finding that the form is inequitable, unfairly discriminatory, misleading, 
deceptive, obscure, unfair, encourages misrepresentation, or not in the public 
interest. See §31A-21-201(3). The Department of Insurance was authorized to 
prohibit the use of the form if it was misleading or deceptive. The fact that the 
State of Utah did not prohibit the use of this form supports the conclusion that the 
form contained a reasonable explanation of underinsured motorist coverage. 
Virtually every form utilized by an insurer is similar if not identical to the form 
utilized by UAIC in this case. The Court of Appeals, without any real explanation 
or guidance, has decided the explanation utilized by UAIC was not reasonable, 
invalidating the signed waiver of underinsured motorist coverage. If this erroneous 
decision without case law, statutory or regulatory support is allowed to stand, 
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virtually every automobile insurance policy in the state will come under scrutiny. 
The legal and financial impact will be immense. 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals exercised an improper interpretation of 
insurance policy language. An insurance policy is a contract between two parties. 
See Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, H 14 (Utah 2007). If the 
language within the four corners of the policy is unambiguous, the parties' intent 
should be surmised from the plain meaning of the contractual language. Id. 
Unambiguous language is given its ordinary meaning. See Alf v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993). Insurance policy language is 
considered ambiguous if it is unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used to express 
the intentions of the parties may be understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P. 3d 428, f 15 (Utah 2006). 
Accordingly, to find that UAIC did not provide a reasonable explanation of 
underinsured motorist coverage, the Court of Appeals would be required to find 
that the language utilized by UAIC in its explanation was ambiguous. The Court 
of Appeals did not make such a finding. The explanation as cited above, is in plain 
English, is clear, does not omit terms and may not be understood to have two 
meanings. The Court of Appeals erred in holding the explanation not to be 
reasonable. 
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meanings. The Court of Appeals erred in holding the explanation not to be 
reasonable. 
II. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to 
award Appellee damages in the amount of $25,000. The issue of damages was 
never addressed in the trial court or the appeal. The amount of damages allegedly 
suffered by Appellee Lopez needs to be supported by evidence and is a jury 
question. Damages are a question of fact, and questions of fact are distinctly 
within the jury's province. See Judd v. Drzega. 103 P.3d 135, f 34 (Utah 2004). 
Summary judgment should be granted only if there has been a showing, that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(C). When reviewing 
a Court of Appeals decision to reverse a trial court's decision granting summary 
judgment to a Defendant and remanding for summary judgment to be entered in 
favor of the Plaintiff, this court reviews the Court of Appeals' legal decisions for 
correctness, without deference. See Rawson at ^ 25. Additionally, this Court 
reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn there from in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party. Id. 
19 
Lopez has not made a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that she is entitled to judgment in the amount of $25,000 as a matter of law. Lopez 
only filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and did not request the trial 
court award damages. Further the record does not contain any evidence of the 
amount of damages allegedly suffered by her as a result of this accident. In her 
motion for partial summary judgment, Lopez only sought an order that the waiver 
was insufficient to comply with the applicable statute. (R. 114). In her 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of her motion for partial 
summary judgment Lopez merely requested that she be given coverage in the 
amount of her bodily injury liability limit of $25,000 (R. 106). Lopez's motion 
was a motion for partial summary judgment because she only sought an order on 
the liability issues and not damages. 
Accordingly, if this Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals 
reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment to El Sol and UAIC it 
still should correct the clear error of the Court of Appeals instructing the trial court 
to enter judgment in favor of Lopez in the amount of $25,000 and remand the case 
for ascertainment of the amount of damages. 
20 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court of Appeals erred in its construction and/or 
application of the meaning of the "reasonable explanation" required by Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-22-305.3(2)(g). Additionally, assuming that the Court of Appeals did 
not err on that issue, it erred in failing to remand the case for ascertainment of the 
amount of damages. Accordingly, UAIC and El Sol respectfully request that the 
Court of Appeals' decision be reversed and that the trial court's granting of 
summary judgment to them be affirmed. In the alternative, UAIC and El Sol 
respectfully request that the Court of Appeals' decision be reversed in part, so that 
an ascertainment of the amount of damages can be conducted in the trial court. 
DATED t h i s ^ day of June 2010. 
DUNN & DUNN, P.C. 
MICHAJ^J. C(5LClNS 
Attorneys for Appellants UAIC and 
El Sol Insurance Agency 
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McHUGH, Judge: 
\1 Plaintiff Maria Lopez appeals from the trial court's order 
granting Defendants United Automobile Insurance Company (United 
Auto) and El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (El Sol) motion for 
summary judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of Lopez's 
claims, We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND1 
H2 On February 1, 2 007, nonparty Miriam Salazar purchased an 
automobile insurance policy (the policy) from El Sol, acting as 
United Auto's agent, As part of her application for coverage, 
Salazar signed a form provided by El Sol that waived underinsured 
motorist (UIM) benefits, 
1Because summary judgment was entered by the trial court, we 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. See Orvis v, Johnson, 2008 UT 2, \ 6, 177 P.3d 600, 
5|3 One week after Salazar's insurance policy took effect, she 
was driving the insured automobile with Lopez as her passenger 
and was struck by another car. Although Salazar was not injured 
by the accident; Lopez sustained several serious injuries. The 
other driver was at fault f or the accident, and his insurer 
tendered its policy limits of $25,000 to Lopez. However, that 
amount waB insufficient to pay the costs associated with Lopez's 
injuries, Lopez subsequently demanded UIM benefits from United 
Auto, which refused to pay based on the form Salazar executed 
rejecting those benefits. 
14 Lopez brought suit against Defendants, alleging that they 
failed to comply with the requirements of the UIM coverage 
statute', sjee Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3 (Supp. 2009)2 
(providing for mandatory availability of UIM benefits and setting 
forth the obligations of the insurer before such benefits may be 
effectively rejected)/ that Defendants breached their duty of 
good faith and fair dealing by failing to explain and offer UIM 
benefits adequately to Salazar/ and that Defendants were 
negligent because they failed to explain UIM benefits adequately 
to Salazar and because they did not provide the relevant forms in 
Spanish.3 In response, Defendants filed a counterclaim, Beeking 
a declaratory judgment that the form waiving UIM benefits 
complied with the UIM coverage statute and, therefore, Lopez was 
not entitled to receive UIM benefits under Salazar's policy. 
5^ After conducting discovery, both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment. The trial court denied Lopez's motion and 
granted Defendants' motion in part,4 which resulted in the 
dismissal of Lopez's claims, The trial court concluded that 
Lopez lacked standing to reform the contract to include UIM 
benefits where Salazar had rejected UIM coverage. The trial 
court also determined that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing does not extend to third parties and that, in any event, 
2As a convenience to the reader, we cite to the current 
version of the code. The relevant statutes have been renumbered 
and amended, but there have been no substantive changeB to the 
pertinent sections of the statutes since the time of the 
accident. 
3Salazar's first language is Spanish/ she speaks very little 
English, El Sol caters to the Spanish-speaking community. 
^Because the trial court denied Lopez's claims, it also 
denied Defendants' counterclaim for summary judgment, stating 
that there was no longer "a justiciable controversy between the 
parties," and that, therefore, a declaratory judgment "would be 
advisory and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction." That ruling 
is not challenged on appeal. 
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the form provided by El Sol "clearly incorporates statutory 
language to reasonably explain the purpose of [UIM] . , . 
coverage." Finally, the trial court held that Defendants were 
not negligent because they did not owe any duty to Lopez, Lopez 
appeals these decisions. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
|^6 Lopez argues that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on her contract and negligence 
claims. We "review[] a trial court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and 
viewU the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 2, H 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted) .5 Thus, we do not accord any deference 
to the trial court regarding its "resolution of the legal issues 
presented[,] and [we] determine only whether the trial court 
erred in applying the governing law." Ervin v. Lowe * B COS . , 2005 
UT App 463, % 8, 128 P,3d 11 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also General Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz, v. Tipton, 2 007 UT App 
109, |^ 7, 158 P.3d 1121 ("In an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment, . . . we give no deference to the trial court's 
decision.")/ cert denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). 
ANALYSIS 
I, The Trial Court Was Correct in Entering Judgment in Favor of 
Defendants on Lopez's Negligence Claim, 
1|7 Defendants challenge Lopez's standing to assert negligence 
claims against them.6 Typically, we would consider this issue 
before turning to the parties' substantive arguments. See Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. , 1999 UT 41, % 9, 979 P.2d 
346 (stating that standing is a threshold issue that must be 
addressed before proceeding to further inquiries on the merits). 
However, Defendants' challenge to Lopez's standing is intertwined 
with the more substantive question of whether the Defendants owed 
a duty to persons, like Lopez, who were unidentified at the time 
5Both parties concede that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact in dispute relevant to this appeal. 
6On appeal, Defendants do not conteBt Lopez's standing in 
connection with her contract claim and the UIM coverage statute. 
Rather, they argue that she lacks standing to pursue her 
negligence claim because any duty they had was to Salazar and did 
not extend to Lopez. 
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that Salazar purchased the automobile insurance. Consequently, 
we discusB these concepts together, 
%B "The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question 
of law to be determined by the court," which determination we 
review for correctness. Ferree v. State, 784 P,2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989) . To recover under a negligence theory, "a plaintiff must 
. , . establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff," which requires a showing that the IM defendant is 
under an[] obligation for the benefit of a particular 
plaintiff.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting ProsBer & Keeton on 
the Law of Torts § 53, at 356-57 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds. , 5th 
ed. 19B'4)). TO determine whether a duty exists, we Hanalyz[e] 
the legal relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of 
injury, the likelihood of injury, public policy as to which party 
can best bear the loss occasioned by the injury, and other 
general policy considerations, Legal duty, then, is the product 
of policy judgments applied to relationships," Normandeau v. 
Hanson Equip. , Inc. , 2009 UT 44, H 19, 215 P,3d 152 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
%9 On appeal, Lopez argues that Defendants had a duty to 
explain UIM coverage fully to Salazar, including providing 
insurance forms to Salazar in Spanish. Even assuming that 
Defendants owed such a duty to Salazar, it does not necessarily 
follow that the duty extended to Lopez. While recognizing that 
Defendants likely owed Salazar a duty to inform her adequately 
about UIM coverage, the trial court held that this duty did not 
extend to unidentified future passengers like Lopez, The trial 
court explained that fulfilling a duty to inform future 
passengers "would be difficult, if not impossible, to do," 
elaborating on these difficulties as follows: 
For example, an insured rejects [UIM] 
coverage. A week later, the insured offers a 
ride to a new co-worker the insured just met. 
If they were involved in an accident, the new 
co-worker would be a statutory third party-
beneficiary to the insured's policy. 
However, the new co-worker would not have 
received information that the insured 
rejected [UIM] coverage until he or she made 
a claim to the insurer and such claim was 
denied. At the time of contracting, neither 
the insured nor the insurer could have 
anticipated that a [particular] "stranger1' 
would be riding in the insured's vehicle and 
therefore, would be a statutory third party 
beneficiary entitled to notice of the 
insured's waiver of [UIM] coverage. Under 
[Lopez's] theory, the insurer would have had 
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a duty to inform the new co-worker without 
the ability to do so and [Lopez's] theory 
would require the insurer to provide the 
waived . . . [UIM] coverage. The Court does 
not agree that the insurer's statutory duty 
to inform extends this far. 
HlO We agree with the trial court's reasoning and legal 
conclusion that the duty to inform does not extend BO far as to 
reach unknown third parties who may later be passengers in an 
insured's vehicle. Therefore, as a matter of law, Lopez is not 
within the group of persons who can assert a negligence claim 
against Defendants, and we affirm the trial court's entry of 
judgment in favor of Defendants on the negligence claim. 
II. Lopez Is Entitled to Judgment on the Contract Claim. 
^11 Lopez next argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded 
that the form provided by El Sol complied with the UIM coverage 
statute.7 See generally Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 . 3 (2) (b) 
(Supp. 2009) (detailing the requirements for an insured to 
purchase UIM coverage that is less than the policy's liability 
limits); id. § 31A-22-305.3 (g) (detailing the requirements for an 
insured to waive UIM coverage). The trial court's 
"interpretation of [the] statutory provision is a question of law 
that we review for correctness." General Sec. Indem. Co. of 
Ariz, v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, f 7, 15B P.3d 1121, cert, 
denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). 
^12 Lopez argues that the form is deficient because it "fails to 
'reasonably explain[] the purpose of [UIM] coverage'" and "[d]oes 
[n]ot [d]isclose the additional premiums required to purchase UIM 
coverage." (Quoting Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2) (b),) In 
response, Defendants argue that the form's language "contains a 
reasonable explanation of the purpose of [UIM] coverage" because 
it mirrors the statutory language defining "[UIM] coverage." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305,3(2) (a) (i) . Defendants also argue 
that disclosure of the additional premiums is not required under 
the statute's waiver provision, Bee id. § 31A-22-305 .3 (2) (g) , but 
instead is only required under the statute's provision for 
selecting UIM benefits in an amount less than the policy's 
liability limits, see id^ § 31A-22-305.3(2)(b). 
^13 We first address Defendants' contention that the form 
provided a reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM coverage, 
as required by the statute. "When presented with questions of 
^Although the trial court partly based its ruling on Lopez's 
lack of standing to seek reformation of the policy, Defendants 
conceded at oral argument that Lopez has Btanding to do so. 
20080846-CA 5 
statutory interpretation, our aim is to discover the true intent 
and purpose of the [1] egislature, " and we look to the statute's 
plain language to determine "the statute's meaning [and to] 
clarify the intent and purposes behind its enactment." Tipton, 
2007 UT App 109, 1 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) . 
Therefore, we begin our analysis of the form's compliance by 
looking to the language of the waiver provision of the UIM 
coverage statute. It provides, in pertinent part: " (i) A named 
insured may reject [UIM] coverage by an express writing to the 
insurer that provides liability coverage . . . . (ii) This 
written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that 
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of [UIM] 
coverage and when it would be applicable." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-305.3(2)(g). 
^ 14 The form Salazar signed states: "Uninsured/Underinsured 
Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment of certain 
benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of 
uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease or death." As Defendants note, the form tracks 
portions of the language of the statute, which provides that 
" [UIM] coverage . . . provides coverage for covered persons who 
are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators 
of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease, or death." Id^ § 31A-22-305.3 (2) (a) (i). 
According to Defendants, the fact that the form's language is 
taken from the statutory definition of UIM coverage conclusively 
demonstrates that the form's explanation was reasonable. We do 
not agree, 
Hl5 Turning first to the statute, we see nothing in Utah Code 
section 31A-22-305.3 (2) (a) (i) that indicates that thiB section 
was intended to constitute the reasonable explanation to a 
consumer of insurance products required by Bection 31A-22-
305.3(2) (g) . To the contrary, the definition is placed at the 
beginning of the UIM coverage section along with the definitions 
of the other terms used in the statute. See Utah Code Ann, 
§ 31A-22-305.3 (1) , (2)(a)(ii). Furthermore, the definition 
itself refers to another section of the statute, 31A-22-
202(1) (c) , to further illuminate the meaning of UIM coverage. By 
the placement of and cross-reference used in the definition, it 
is apparent that the legislature anticipated that the definition 
would be used in the context of the entire statutory scheme--
provisions which may not be readily available to the average 
consumer. Consequently, we see nothing in the statute that would 
create a safe harbor for Defendants due to their inclusion of 
some of the statutory definition in the form. 
^16 Because there is no presumption of compliance, we now 
consider the reasonableness of the explanation provided to 
Salazar. In doing so, we are guided by this court's prior 
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decision in General Security Indemnity Co, of Arizona v, Tipton, 
2007 UT App 109, 158 P,3d 1121, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 
2007) . In Tipton, the insured claimed that her selection of 
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage at a level lower than the 
statutory minimum was invalid where the application form did not 
attempt to explain the purposes of UM coverage or provide any 
information regarding the different premiums for higher levels of 
UM coverage as required by the applicable statute. See id. %*h 2, 
8. We agreed that the application did not comply with the 
statute, making the plaintiff's waiver of higher UM coverage 
invalid. See icL 11 23. 
^17 In reaching that conclusion, we relied on the legislative 
history of the UM and UIM statutes, see id. 1 11 n.6/ noting that 
the "statutes are designed to protect insureds by providing 
compensation to those who are injured or killed by uninsured 
motorists or other financially irresponsible motorists" and that 
the "statutes are designed for the benefit of insureds and not 
insurers. [They are] adopted to benefit the insured motorist, 
and tare] not intended to relieve . . . insurers of primary 
responsibility . . . or to benefit them in any way." Id. % 13 
(emphases added) (alterations and omissions in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), Accordingly, the statute 
places .the burden on the insurer to show that the form provided a 
reasonable explanation of the purposes of UM coverage. See id. 
H 15. To meet that burden, the insurer must demonstrate that "a 
meaningful offer" of coverage was made and that the offer waB 
"sufficient to permit the insured to make an intelligent, 
informed decision on desired or desirable coverages.11 Id. Thus, 
" [t]he insurer has an affirmative duty to notify the insured in a 
manner reasonably calculated to place necessary information in 
the insured ' s hands." Id. 
^18 Although Tipton addressed the issue in the context of the 
selection of lower UM coverage, rather than the complete 
rejection of UIM coverage, the Tipton court relied on the 
legislative history of the UIM provisions in its analysis, 
stating that it was "comfortable being guided by" the legislative 
history and policy of the closely analogous UIM provision. See 
id, H 11 n,6. In light of our previous statements in Tipton and 
the nearly identical language of the UM and UIM coverage 
statutes, we are similarly comfortable relying on the Tipton 
court's analysis of the UM statute in our analysis of the UIM 
statute here. 
^19 The central policy underlying Tipton is that the statute 
imposes an "affirmative duty" on insurers to provide consumers of 
insurance products with information in a clear, understandable 
way that will empower them to make informed decisions regarding 
UM and UIM coverage, See id. % 15. The form provided by El Sol 
states that UIM coverage "provides payment of certain benefits 
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for damages caused by the owner or operator of 
uninsured/underineured motor vehicles." We agree with Lopez that 
this language fails to provide consumers like Salazar with the 
information needed to make an informed decision regarding 
insurance coverage. Indeed, the form's language omits 
information in a way that makes it less understandable than the 
statute defining UIM coverage. While the statute provides 
separate definitions for "uninsured motorist coverage", see Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-305 (3) (a) (Supp. 2009), and "underinsured 
motorist coverage,» see icL § 31A-22-305.3(2)(a)(i), thereby 
highlighting their distinct purposes, the explanation in the form 
combines the two into a single definition, referring to them 
collectively as "Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury 
Coverage." Likewise, there is nothing in the form that explains 
the differences in the "certain benefits" provided by UIM 
coverage as compared with UM coverage or "when it would be 
applicable," as required by the UIM coverage statute, see id. 
§ 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) . In contrast, the legislature 
separately addressed each type of insurance, compare id. § 31A-
22-305 (UM coverage), with id. § 31A-22-305.3 (UIM coverage),8 
and included the definition of UIM coverage among other defined 
terms in the UIM coverage section, see id. § 31A-22-3 05 ,3 (1) -
(2) (a) . 
5|20 The UIM statute provides a definition that can be used in 
connection with its other provisions to determine the obligations 
of insurers with respect to UIM coverage. One of those 
obligations is to provide consumers electing whether, and in what 
amount, to purchase coverage a "reasonable explanation of the 
purpose of [UIM] coverage and when it would be applicable." Id. 
§ 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) . The definition in the form provided to 
Salazar does not give that reasonable explanation using language 
that would be understood by an ordinary consumer. Although 
Defendants were not required to provide Salazar with a lengthy 
treatise explaining UIM coverage, they had an affirmative duty to 
use a form that provided Salazar with a reasonable and 
understandable explanation of the purpose of UIM benefits that 
would enable her "to make an intelligent, informed decision" 
regarding the selection of UIM coverage. Tipton, 2007 UT App 
109, \ 15/ Bee also Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(2) (g) (ii) . 
Because the form provided by Defendants did not provide a 
reasonable explanation, Salazar's waiver of UIM coverage was 
invalid. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305,3(2) (g) (ii) , 
BAlthough the earlier version of the statute dealt with both 
UM and UIM in a single section of the Utah Code, see Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-305 (2005) (current version as amended at Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 31A-22-305, -305.3 (Supp. 2009)), UM coverage was 
addressed in subsections (2)-(7), while UIM coverage was 
separately covered by subsections (8)-(11), 
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Therefore, Lopez is entitled to UIM benefits under the policy, 
which the statute requires to be in an amount uequal to the 
lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle liability 
coverage or the maximum UIM coverage limits available by the 
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy," id. § 31A-22-
305.3(b).9 In this case, the parties agree that amount 1B 
$25,000, 
CONCLUSION 
H21 We affirm the trial court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants on the negligence claim because they owed no 
duty to Lopez to explain UIM coverage to Salazar, The trial 
court was incorrect, however, in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants on the contract claim. Because the form 
provided by Defendants did not reasonably explain the purposes of 
UIM coverage and when it would be applicable as required by the 
UIM coverage statute, Salazar1s waiver of coverage was invalid 
and Lopez is entitled to receive UIM benefits, We therefore 
reverse the trial court's order granting Defendant's summary 
judgment motion and remand for entry of judgment in favor of 
Lopez in the amount of $25,000. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
^22 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T, Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
9Because we conclude that the form did not provide a 
reasonable explanation of the purposes of UIM benefits, we 
decline to address Lopez's contention that Defendants were 
required to disclose the additional premiums for UIM coverage. 
However, we noted in General Security Indemnity Co. of Arizona v. 
Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, ^ 9 n.5, 158 P,3d 1121, cert, denied, 
168 P. 3d 819 (Utah 2007), that there are different statutory 
requirements for waiver of all UM benefits and waiver of a higher 










TJST ALL ACCIDENTS AND VIOLATIONS i ^R ALL DRIVERS BELOW 






2006 02 01 
2001 09-01 
Description of Accident or Violation 
SPEEDING OVLK 01-10 MI'H ABOVE LIMIT 
SPEEDING OVEK 01-10 MPH ABOVE LIMIT 
DKIVING W/O VALID DL, OK WHILESUS/KEVOk 
Location 
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED MOTORISTS PROPERTY DAMAGE COVERAGE 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305(4) requires that every automobile policy which does noi provide insurance lor 
collision damage shall provide coveiage foi pioperty damage to the moloi vehlcle(s) described in the policy, to the extent that 
you aie legally entitled to recover from the owner 01 operatoi of an uninsured motor vehicle This coveiage shall not exceed 
the molor vehicle's actual cash value or $3,500, whichever is less, and is subject to a 1250 deductible I have read the above, 
and agiee to the deletion of Uninsured Motorists Property Damage Coverage 
I have read & understand this waiver Signature of Applicant X_ Date 02/01/2007 
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS BODILY INJURY COVERAGE 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every automobile policy include Unlnsured/Undermsured Motorists 
Bodily Injury Coverage with limits equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless you select a different limit than your Bodily Injury 
Coverage or reject the Uninsuied/Undennsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage entirely Unmsured/Undeiinsured Motorists 
Bodily Injury Coverage provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of 
unlnsured/undennsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death Please indicate your desire to 
entirely reject Uninsured/Undennsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage oi whethei you desire this coverage at limits other 
than the Bodily Injury limits of your poticy 
• a I heieby reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
[X) b I hereby reject Undennsured Motorist Coverage 
[g c I hereby select Uninsured Motorists Coverage limits of 25000/50000 which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits 
n d I hereby select Undennsured Motorists Coverage limits of which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits 
I understand and agree to the selection of any of the above options to my liability insurance policy Future renewals or replacements of this 
policy will be issued at the same Uninsured/UndennsuwMotonst limits JLLdecide to select another option at some future time, I must let the 
Company oi my agenl in writing / / / ^ \ /f ^. si 
Signature of Applicant X ( '////M* r \ ^ k ^
 D a t e 02/01/2007 
AGREEMENT V^IVING PIP LOSS OF GROSS INCOME BENEFITS 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-307 requires that every automobile policy include Personal Injury Protection Insurance 
Code Section 31 A-22-307(4) also allows you to waive loss of gross Income benefits under Personal injury Piotectlon 
Coverage, subjBd ID the following requiiement The Named Insured must certify in writing that toi the previous 31 days and 
lor at least the nexl 1B0 days, neither the insured noi the insured's spouse will received earned income from regular 
employment I have read the above, and agree to the waiving of loss of gross income benefits under Personal Injury 
Protection Coveiage 
02/01/2007
 Signature of Applicant X Dote 
NAMED DRIVER EXCLUSION ENDORSEMENT 
WARNING - READ THIS ENDORSEMENT CAREFULLY! 
This acknowledgement and rejection is applicable to all renewals issued by any affiliated insurer or us 
In consideration of the premium charged for this policy, H is agreed we shall not be held liable and no liability 01 obligation of 
any kind shall attach to us for bodily injuries, tosses or damages undei any of the coverages of the policy while any motoi 
vehicle is operated by an Excluded Duvet 
EXCLUDED DRIVER(S) NAMES 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
MARIA LOPEZ, individually and on behalf 
of all similarly situated person, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Florida corporation, EL SOL 




AND ORDER RE: 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
PLAINTIFF'S FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVITS AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVITS 
Case No. 070422402 
Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
This matter came before the Court on August 4, 2008, for hearing on Defendants United 
Automobile Insurance Company and El Sol Insurance Agency, LLC's (jointly referred to as 
"Defendants" or individually as "UAIC" and "ESIA") Motion for Summary Judgment, Maria Lopez' 
("Plaintiff) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of 
Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch. Daniel F. Bertch 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiff, Michael J. Collins appeared on behalf of Defendants. The Court 
took the matter under advisement. 
Having considered the parties arguments, briefs and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS 
both Defendants' Motions to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch and DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the 
BACKGROUND 
On February 8,2007, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by non-party Miriam 
Salazar ("Salazar") when non-party Abie Martinez ("Martinez") rear-ended the vehicle operated 
by Salazar and occupied by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered severe injuries in the 
accident, including injuries to her head, neck, back, legs and other parts of her body. 
UAIC issued a motor vehicle policy, policy number UTS 000611667, to Salazar with a 
policy period of Febmary 1, 2007 through August 1, 2007, that did not include underinsured 
coverage, but did include uninsured coverage as reflected by Salazar's signed application.1 
1
 A week before the accident, on February 1,2007, Salazar signed an application for 
insurance with Defendants that included the following language: 
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE 
Utah Insurance Code Section 31A-22-305 requires that every automobile policy 
include Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage with limits 
equal to the Bodily Injury limit, unless you select a different limit than your 
Bodily Injury Coverage or reject the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily 
Injury Coverage entirely. Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury 
Coverage provides payment of certain benefits for damages caused by the owner 
or operator of uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, 
sickness, disease or death. Please indicate your desire to entirely reject 
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists/Bodily Injury Coverage or whether you desire 
this coverage at limits other than the Bodily Injury limits of your policy. 
• a. I hereby reject Uninsured Motorist Coverage. 
B b. I hereby reject Underinsured Motorist Coverage. 
H c. I hereby select Uninsured Motorists Coverage limits of 25000/50000 
which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits. 
• d. I hereby select Underinsured Motorists Coverage limits of 
which equals my Bodily Injury liability limits. 
I understand and agree to the selection of any of the above options to my liability 
insurance policy. Future renewals or replacements of this policy will be issued at 
the same Uninsured/Undersmsured Motorist limits. If I decide to select another 
option at some future time, I must let the Company or my agent in writing. 
Martinez was insured by Progressive Insurance Company ("Progressive") with liability 
limits of $25,000. Progressive tendered its limits to Lopez and UAIC consented to the settlement 
and waived its rights of subrogation against Martinez. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff made a claim to Defendants for underinsured motorist benefits. 
Defendants rejected Plaintiffs claim because Salazar did not have underinsured coverage. 
On December 26, 2007, Plaintiff filed the present law suit against Defendants alleging 
three causes of action: Count I for Individual Contract Claim by Lopez, Count II for Class Breach 
of Contract Claim, and Count IE for Individual Negligence Claim. 
Defendants filed their joint answer and counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment on 
January 23, 2008. 
Thereafter, the parties filed the cross motions for summary judgment and cross motions to 
strike. 
CROSS MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Upon reviewing Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch, the Court concludes that the 
information in those affidavits are not necessary for the Court to render a decision. The Court's 
decision is partially based upon Defendants duty to Plaintiff and standing to bring a claim, which 
are a matter of law. Further, the parol evidence rule bars extraneous evidence that attempts to 
contradict or vary the terms of a written document. For these reasons, the Court summarily 
Signature of Applicant: x /s/ Miriam Salazar Date: 02/01/2007 
GRANTS both Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavits of Salazar and Lopez and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike Rule 56(f) Affidavit of Bertch. 
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
considering cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court is not bound to grant it to one 
side or another. Diamond T. Utah, Inc. V. Travelers Indent. Co., 441 P.2d 705 (1968). 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT I - Individual Contract Claim by Lopez 
Plaintiff claims that Defendants owed non-party Salazar a duty to explain underinsured 
motorist coverage, to set forth the option to accept or decline underinsured motorist coverage, 
and if desired, to select one of various limits or amounts of coverage according to respective 
premiums. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failure to offer underinsured motorist benefits 
constituted a breach of good faith and fair dealing required of them as a first party insurance 
provider. Plaintiff claims Defendants duty to non-party Salazar extended to her as an occupant of 
Salazar's car. The Court disagrees that Defendants duty to non-party Salazar extended to 
Plaintiff 
'The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an implied contractual provision, and a 
cause of action for its breach sounds in contract." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 
798 n.8. "Utah law clearly limits the duty of good faith to first parties to insurance contracts. 
Consequently, only a first party can sue for breach of that duty." Speriy v. Speriy, 990 P.2d 381, 
T| 7 (Utah 1999). In Utah, the term "first party" is used to refer to an insurance agreement where 
the insurer agrees to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured. 
In contrast, a "third party" situation is one where the insurer contracts to defend the insured 
against claims made by third parties against the insured and to pay any resulting liability, up to 
the specified dollar limit. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shores, \A1 P.3d 456, 461-62 \ 
25 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)(citing Sperry v. Speny, 990 P.2d at ffl 7-8); see also Pixton v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. \99\){concluding there is no duty of 
good faith and fair dealing imposed upon an insurer running to a third-party claimant seeking to 
recover against the company's insured). "[A]n action for breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing may be brought only by a party to the insurance contract." Savage v. Educators 
Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 865 (Utah 1995); see also Bad Faith Claims Against Insurers: The State 
of Utah Law Fifteen Years after Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 15 BYU J. Pub. L. 53 
(2000). 
Given the clear rule in Utah that a third party beneficiary of an insurance contract does 
not have standing to sue for the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiff, as a third 
party beneficiary of the insurance contract, camiot bring a cause of action for the breach of duty 
of good faith and fair dealing against Defendants.2 Plaintiff and Defendants share no privity of 
contract for the duty of good faith and fair dealing to attach; rather that privity runs between 
Defendants and non-party Salazar. The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact 
exist on the breach of contract claim and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count 
I. 
2
 The Court notes that there are situations where a third party beneficiary of an insurance 
contract may have standing to sue the insurer, but the situation in the case at bar is not one of 
them. 
As an alternative basis for granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, the Court 
concludes that even if Plaintiff had standing to sue Defendants for the breach of duty of good 
faith and fair dealing, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Defendants met the 
requirements of Utah law for Salazar to reject underinsured motorist coverage. Utah law requires 
that every automobile insurance policy shall include underinsured coverage, unless affinnatively 
waived under Section 31A-22-305.3(2) of the Utah Code. Utah Code § 31 A-22-302(l)(c). A 
named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing on "a form 
provided by the insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured 
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable." Utah Code § 31A-22-305.3(2)(g). For an 
effective rejection of underinsured coverage in its entirety, the statute imposes a duty on the 
insurer to provide a form that reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage 
and when underinsured motorist coverage would be applicable for a rejection of the 
underinsurance coverage to be valid.3 hi reviewing Defendants' form in footnote 1 signed by 
3
 hi General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Tipton, 158 P.3d 1121, n.5 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2007), cert denied, Fulcrum v. Tipton, 2007 Utah LEXIS 127 (UT 2007), the Utah 
Court of Appeals distinguished two subsections of the uninsured statute. This Court applies the 
same distinction to the underinsured statute. Specifically, subsection 2(b) of § 31 A-22-305.3 
states: 
For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured 
motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor 
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits 
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the 
insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgement 
form that: 
(i) is filed with the department; 
(ii) is provided by the insurer; 
(iii) waives the higher coverage; 
(iv) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; 
and 
Salazar, the Court concludes that the form clearly incorporates statutory language to reasonably 
explain the puipose of underinsured motorist coverage and when underinsured motorist coverage 
would be applicable. The fact that Salazar selected uninsured motorist coverage and rejected 
underinsured motorist coverage reflects a rational decision on her part to select certain coverage 
and reject other coverage. The breach of contract claim fails because Plaintiff cannot establish 
there was a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Non-party Salazar rejected 
underinsured motorist coverage so the policy does not contain the coverage Plaintiff seeks. 
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if the Plaintiff had standing to 
sue for the breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing because no genuine issues of material 
fact exist that the Defendants met the statutory requirements of Utah law. 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT II - Class Action Breach of Contract Claim 
Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a purported class, alleges a breach of contract action 
against Defendants. The basis of Plaintiff s purported class action claims are based on the 
implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing, As stated above, supra Count I, 
Defendants owed no implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff 
has no breach of contract cause of action for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
against Defendants. To represent a class of people, Plaintiff should be in a same or similar 
(v) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist 
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle 
liability coverage or the maximum undersinsured motorist coverage limits available by 
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
Subsection 2(b) specifically relates to the situation when an insurance consumer is choosing to 
waive a higher level of underinsured motorist coverage, but is not rejecting such coverage 
entirely. Whereas, in this case before the Court, Salazar rejected underinsured coverage in its 
entirety, the Court applies subsection 2(g) of § 31 A-22-305.3, rather than subsection 2(b). 
position as those in the class. Since there is no class of litigants like Plaintiff that would have a 
claim against Defendants, Plaintiff does not have an adequate interest to have standing to 
represent the class. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on Count II. 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNT III - Individual Negligence Claim by Lopez 
Plaintiff claims Defendants were negligent in their statutory duty to inform her and 
Salazar of the meaning, and the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, together with 
premiums charged for that coverage, at a minimum in a form that correctly complied with these 
duties in English, as well as in Spanish, the language spoken by the class of consumers that 
Defendants specifically market. 
To support a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that defendant 
owed plaintiff a duty, defendant breached the duty, and the breach of the duty was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff s injury and damages. Rose v. Provo City, 67 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003). The issue of whether there is a duty requires an analysis of the legal relations between the 
parties. Lovelandv, Orem City Corp. 746 P.2d 763, 778 (Utah 1987). Legal duties are often 
found to exist in the context of contractual, fiduciary, and filial relationships. AMS Salt 
Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corporation of America, 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that in some cases the acts constituting a breach 
of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give 
rise to causes of action in tort. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 n.3. For example, 
a duty to refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional distress to others, breach of duty to 
bargain in good faith could amount to fraudulent activity, or under various unfair practices acts, 
there may be statutory requirements that give rise to independent torts. Id. 
Plaintiff claims that Defendants' statutory duty to infonn Salazar on the underinsured 
coverage extended to her as an occupant of non-party Salazar's car. The Court disagrees that 
Defendants statutory duty to infonn applied to Plaintiff. The statutory duty was owed to Salazar, 
not Plaintiff. Plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract between Salazar and Defendants. 
Accordingly, she cannot claim there was a breach of the statutory duty to inform her. To extend 
the statutory duty to inform to a statutory third party beneficiary of an insurance contract would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to do. At the time of contracting for an insurance policy, the 
insurer and insured would have to determine who the statutory third party beneficiaries of the 
insurance contract are, who that would include in the context of the insured and then somehow 
infonn those statutory third party beneficiaries of the insured's decision to reject underinsured 
motorist coverage. This would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do. 
For example, an insured rejects underinsured motorist coverage. A week later, the 
insured offers a ride to a new co-worker the insured just met. If they were involved in an 
accident, the new co-worker would be a statutory third party beneficiary to the insured's policy. 
However, the new co-worker would not have received information that the insured rejected 
underinsurance coverage until he or she made a claim to the insurer and such claim was denied. 
At the time of contracting, neither the insured nor the insurer could have anticipated that a 
"stranger" would be riding in the insured's vehicle and therefore, would be a statutory third party 
beneficiary entitled to notice of the insured's waiver of underinsured motorist coverage. Under 
the Plaintiffs theory, the insurer would have had a duty to inform the new co-worker without the 
ability to do so and the Plaintiffs theory would require the insurer to provide the waived 
coverage for underinsured motorist coverage. The Court does not agree that the insurer's 
statutory duty to inform extends this far. Utah law imposes a duty on the insurer to inform the 
insured of coverages that the insured may waive, so that an insured can make an informed 
decision on the insurance coverage they are contracting for. To impose the statutory duty to 
inform to statutory third party beneficiaries would be extending the insurer's duty too far and 
interfere with the insurer and insured's ability to contract for insurance coverage. If the 
Plaintiffs rule were adopted, the impact would be to null the insurer and insured's ability to 
contract because even if an insured properly waived their statutory right to underinsured motorist 
coverage and did not pay a premium for it, an insurer would still be required to pay underinsured 
motorist coverage to statutory third party beneficiaries because the insurer did not give them 
notice of the insured's exercised right to waive the statutory underinsured motorist coverage. 
The Court concludes that there is no such duty for an insurer to inform third party beneficiaries 
of an insured's waiver of the statutory underinsured motorist coverage. 
Plaintiff also claims there was a duty for Defendants forms to be in Spanish. However, 
Plaintiff fails to cite a statute, case law or insurance department regulation requiring that such 
forms and explanation be provided in Spanish. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to show that there is a 
duty to do so. 
In summary, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue a negligence claim because there is no 
legal duty for an insurer to inform a passenger in an insured's vehicle of the insured's waiver of 
statutory underinsured motorist coverage and there was no legal duty to provide the forms in 
Spanish. Without a legal duty to Plaintiff, there can be no prima facie showing of a negligence 
claim and the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count III. 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Defendants request the Court declare the (1) the waiver of underinsured motorist 
coverage by Miriam Salazar complied with the relevant provisions of the Utah Code, and 
therefore is valid, (2) UAIC Policy Number UTS 000611667 issued to Miriam Salazar does not 
contain underinsured motorist coverage, (3) Plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist 
benefits under UAIC Policy Number UTS 000611667, and (4) that each party shall bear their 
own costs of suit, including paying their own attorneys fees and costs. 
"Generally, courts have held that the conditions which must exist before a declaratory 
judgment action can be maintained are: (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) the interests of the 
parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking such relief must have a legally protectible interest 
in the controversy; and (4) the issues between the parties involved must be ripe for judicial 
detennination." Bairdv, State, 574 P.2d 713,715 (Utah 1978). The declaratory judgment statute 
does not remove the keystone from "our judicial framework—the presence of a justiciable 
controversy—and reconfigure our courts into forums where the curious or the confused may 
acquire legal guidance." Id. at 716. "A Declaratory Judgment Statute cannot be so construed as 
to authorize the courts to deliver advisory opinions or pronounce judgments on abstract 
questions, but there must be the invariable justiciable controversy present in such cases." Id. 
'The courts have no jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment in the absence of a justiciable 
or actual controversy" Id. 
The Court's decision pertaining to Counts I, II and IH reflect that Plaintiff claims against 
Defendants fail. The effect of the Court's decision is to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants. No longer is there a justiciable controversy between the parties. Accordingly, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to make further declarations on additional issues. A decision on issues, 
other than those addressed above, would be wholly advisory. "When it is ascertained that there is 
no jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can 
go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action, and jurisdiction cannot be 
conferred by consent or any other act of the parties." Id. To make a declaratory judgment on 
additional issues would exceed this Court's jurisdiction, therefore, the Court DENIES 
Defendants counterclaim for declaratory judgment. 
ORDER 
The Court hereby ORDERS: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN 
PART AND DENIED IN PART, specifically, the Court: 
GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff on 
Plaintiffs Counts I, II and IE, and 
DENIES summary judgment on Defendants Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment 
because such declaration would be advisory and would exceed the Court's jurisdiction. 
DATED this J_ day of September, 2008. 
q^onora l eOpRRYL. CHRISTIANS 
TmrcTDisil'l^ Court Judge - : // 
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